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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
: APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
v. : 
ROBERT ALAN PHILLIPS : Case No. 920071-CA 
: Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(3)(i) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's Motion to 
Withdraw his Guilty Plea in view of absence from the record of 
facts showing a factual basis upon which to determine and/or 
admission from the defendant charged with the crime of aggravated 
murder, that he committed the crime intentionally, an element of 
the crime with which he is charged. The standard for review is 
substantial compliance. State v. Hickman, 779 P. 2d 670 (Utah 
1989). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES, ETC, 
1. Utah Code Ann. section 77-13-6: 
A request to withdraw a plea of guilty may be 
withdrawn only upon good cause and with leave of court. 
2. Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-202: 
Criminal homicide, murder, first degree: 
If actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death 
of another while engaged in the commission of, or an 
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or 
attempting to commit aggravated robbery. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order by the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Michael Murphy, dated May 12, 1992, which denied 
Appellant's motion to set aside the guilty plea entered by him some 
12 years previously. The plea was entered on June 16, 1980, to a 
charge of aggravated robbery and murder. On February 18, 1992, the 
appellant moved to set aside the guilty plea, based on the fact 
that the trial court, in its colloquy with Appellant at the time 
the plea was entered, failed to ascertain whether he committed the 
crime intentionally, since it appears this element of the charge 
against him was denied. 
The matter was heard on March 23, 1992, by Judge Murphy who 
denied it. The appellant filed his notice of appeal on June 5, 
1992. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about January 1, 1980, it is alleged that the defendant 
shot and killed one Everett Hamby in the course of a robbery. He 
and an accomplice, Kendall Northern, were subsequently arrested in 
connection with this crime, and the defendant was charged with 
aggravated robbery and aggravated murder. 
Pursuant to negotiations between the defendant and his 
attorneys and the Salt Lake County Attorney's office, the defendant 
agreed to plead guilty to the murder charge in return for a promise 
that the State would not "make an impassioned plea" for the 
imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, on June 16, 1980, 
the plea was entered before the Honorable Christine M. Durham, who 
at the time was a judge on the Third District Court. During the 
colloquy between the court and the defendant, the judge made the 
usual inquires to determine whether the guilty plea was being 
entered intelligently and voluntarily; and in addition, the 
following exchange took place: 
THE COURT: All right. Specifically, the Information 
alleges that on or about January 1, 1980, here in Salt Lake 
County, you caused the death of Everett Hamby, Jr., while you 
were engaged in the commission of an aggravated robbery. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Ma'am. 
THE COURT: Are those facts true and correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. And did you cause his death 
knowingly and intentionally at that time? 
3 
THE DEFENDANT: Not intentionally. It was accidental. But I 
was still at fault. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Transcript of Disposition Hearing (hereinafter Tr.) at pp. 8-9 
(emphasis added). 
Notwithstanding the above representations, the court accepted 
the guilty plea and sentenced the defendant to life in prison. 
(Tr. at 309-10). During his lengthy incarceration, the defendant 
reconsidered the circumstances surrounding his entry of the guilty 
plea and decided to move to withdraw it. However, he was unable to 
find counsel to assist him, notwithstanding reasonable exertions on 
his part. (See Affidavit of Robert Alan Phillips, paragraph 4). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
By failing to ascertain whether the appellant was admitting to 
the element of intent which is essential to the charge against him, 
the District Court committed reversible error in accepting the 
appellant's guilty plea. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A MOTION TO WITHDRAW A PLEA OF GUILTY MAY BE MADE IF THE 
DEFENDANT CAN PROVE MANIFEST INJUSTICE. 
Withdrawal of a guilty plea in this criminal case was governed 
by Utah Code Ann. section 77-13-6, which provides as follows: 
A reguest to withdraw a plea of guilty may be withdrawn 
only upon good cause shown and with leave of court. 
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The defendant concedes that the 12-year lapse between the 
entry of his plea and his motion to withdraw it does involve 
unusual circumstances that justify granting this motion, 
notwithstanding the lengthy delay in presenting it. Although it is 
a comparatively rare event, courts have been known to grant motions 
to withdraw guilty pleas even though made long after sentencing. 
In a number of jurisdictions, a post-sentencing motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty may be made if the defendant can prove 
"manifest injustice," a phrase appearing in Rule 32(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and defined as an injustice 
that is obvious and directly observable, overt, not obscuring. 
Webster's International Dictionary (1966). This has been found to 
exist in cases where the defendant was not informed of his right to 
the assistance of counsel, whether his own or appointed by the 
court; where the defendant was not informed of possible defenses 
available to him; and most importantly, in cases where the 
defendant exhibited doubt concerning his guilt as to some essential 
element of the offense. 
In State v. Taylor, 521 P. 2d 699 (Wash. 1974), the defendant 
pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of second-degree assault. The 
lower court granted his motion to withdraw his plea, but on appeal 
the order was vacated based on the fact that the withdrawal of the 
defendant's guilty plea was not necessary to correct a "manifest 
injustice." The Supreme Court in this instance, however, states 
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that even if the defendant's constitutional rights have been 
safeguarded when he enters his plea, it may be set aside to correct 
manifest injustice: 
Every effort has been made to ascertain that the plea of 
guilty is made voluntarily, with understanding and with 
reasonable knowledge of the important conseguences. That 
being the case, trial courts should exercise greater 
caution in setting aside a guilty plea once the reguired 
safeguards have been employed. Id. at 701. 
Such extraordinary rulings have usually been made in cases 
where the plea was entered under such circumstances as amounted to 
a violation of the defendant's fundamental constitutional rights. 
For example, 
Where it is established that a defendant has failed to 
understand the conseguences of his plea (Carter v. United 
States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 306 F.2d 283 (1962); or, 
where a defendant was denied effective assistance of 
counsel (Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 
1963); or, where the plea was induced by threats or 
promises (Semet v. United States, 369 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 
1966). 
In State v. Taylor, 521 P. 2d 699 (1974), the court agrees 
that the above text would serve to establish "manifest injustice." 
The court also states that this is not an exclusive list and if 
facts presented to the court do not fall within said list, manifest 
injustice can still be found by a showing of the facts. Ibid, at 
702. 
A. DEFENDANT WAS NOT FULLY INFORMED OF HIS DEFENSES 
If we review the facts in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 
25 (1970), the defendant entered a plea of guilty while not 
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factually acknowledging guilt in order to avoid the death penalty. 
The court found the plea to be a voluntary and knowing one since 
under the circumstances there was strong evidence of guilt. In 
Strong v. Turner. 22 Utah 2d 294 (1969), the defendant's plea 
bargain was not set aside even though his plea to a robbery charge 
was on the promise that other charges would be dismissed. It was 
argued that this arrangement constituted undue persuasion and 
coercion. On appeal, the defendant and his counsel elected not to 
introduce the record of the original proceeding and presented as 
fact their own evidence at the habeas corpus proceeding. The 
Supreme Court of Utah justified its decision by reasoning that: 
It is the prerogative of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the evidence. While it is true that he 
should not arbitrarily reject competent, credible, 
uncontradicted testimony, nevertheless he is not 
compelled to believe evidence where there is anything 
about it which would reasonably justify refusal to accept 
it as the facts, and this includes the self-interest of 
the witness. 
Id. at 295, citing Gaqos v. Industrial Commission, 39 P. 2d 697 
(1934). 
The matter before you differs from Carolina v. Alford, Ibid. 
in that there is no strong evidence of guilt in this matter. 
During the course of Appellant's guilty plea hearing, the original 
record of the proceeding shows that there followed a proffer by 
defense counsel regarding the facts that existed to establish 
intent. Evidence produced in the hearing indicated that the 
defendant fired three shots, but that the first shot — the one he 
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states was accidentally fired — had killed the victim. (Tr. at 
166-167). Since intent to kill was an essential element of the 
prosecution's case, it logically follows that the second and third 
shots, although intentionally fired, could not have resulted in the 
crime with which the defendant was charged; and that if the first 
shot was in fact fired accidentally, the defendant could not be 
guilty of this specific-intent crime. (Tr. at 166-167). In this 
connection, it is interesting to note that counsel for the State 
admitted at the hearing that the killing could have been 
accidental. (Tr. at 165-166, 171, 191). Defense counsel argued at 
some length that an inference could be drawn from the facts 
surrounding the killing that it was accidental. (T. at 198-205). 
A large part of the prosecution's case centered around 
statements made by Kendall Northern, whose credibility was placed 
in serious question by the prosecutor himself. (Tr. at 169, 171, 
186, 196). Northern was shown to be a domineering individual and 
a pathological liar; and in addition, there is considerable doubt 
as to whether he in fact saw the fatal shot fired. (Tr. at 179-
180). 
Appellant's circumstance does not differ from that in State v. 
Lance, 651 P. 2d 1003 (Mont. 1982), where the defendant pleaded 
guilty to a charge of custodial interference arising out of his 
removal of his son from the custody of his ex-wife. The plea was 
entered on December 18, 1979, and the motion to withdraw the plea 
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was filed on February 18, 1982. Although the trial court denied 
the motion, the Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the 
ground that the trial court, in accepting the plea, had not fully 
informed the defendant of the defenses available to him; and in 
addition, the Supreme Court noted that in view of the circumstances 
of this case, the three-year interval did not justify the denial. 
The standard by which the validity of a guilty plea is 
judged is whether the plea represents a voluntary and 
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of 
action open to the defendant as affirmatively disclosed 
by the record. Id. at 1005. 
B. THE PROFFER OF EVIDENCE PRODUCED REGARDING THE FACTS THAT 
EXISTED DOES NOT ESTABLISH INTENT 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-202 (1953 as amended) defines 
Criminal Homicide, Murder- First Degree, as a capital offense: if 
the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another 
while engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or 
flight after committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery. 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, was enacted in the 
1980 legislative session and was not effective until July 1, 1980. 
Laws of Utah, 19890 Ch. 14, Section I. As a consequence, it is 
inapplicable to the plea in this case which was entered June 16, 
1980. The applicable standard was articulated in Strong v. Turner, 
22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P. 2d 323, 324 (1969). There the Court 
indicated that a plea must be made voluntarily and with a clear 
understanding of the charge. When Rule 11 was enacted, guilty 
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The appellant respectfully submits that, even under the less 
stringent standard, the trial court's acceptance of his guilty plea 
in 1980 failed to pass constitutional muster. The facts showing 
the crime of murder, an element of which is that it was done 
intentionally is not established by the facts presented to the 
court. Thus, there would have been no reason for Defendant to 
plead guilty to murder when it was not committed, unless he 
believed through misapprehension of nature and element of crime, 
that he had committed it intentionally. 
In State v. Breckenridge, 688 P. 2d 440 (Utah 1983), Defendant 
appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to 
charge of arson. The dispositive question was whether his 
conviction could stand where there is no record of facts showing 
that the charged crime was intentionally committed by the 
defendant. While working at a shop, the defendant decided to 
dispose of some old parts by igniting them with a torch. The fire 
spread to the roof and caused extensive damage to the building. 
Following his arrest the defendant confessed to starting a fire. 
His confession was admitted at his motion to set aside his plea and 
in it he is asked if he intended to set fire to the whole shop. 
The answer was no. On advice of his counsel, he pled guilty to a 
lesser charge of arson and was questioned on the voluntariness of 
his plea and whether he was in fact guilty of arson. He admitted 
to the court that he had intentionally damaged the building and 
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Such a rule is consistent with the orderly and 
proper administration of justice in criminal cases. It 
clearly protects the defendant's right to an opportunity 
to establish his innocence in a trial before a jury. 
Id, at 771, citing State v. Stacy, 261 P. 2d 400, 403 (Wash. 1953). 
In Mullin, the court stated that denial of the defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea, under the circumstances of the case, 
constituted a denial of due process of law in violation of the 
state and federal constitutions. 
CONCLUSION 
The present case involves a manifest injustice, in that the 
defendant's guilty plea was accepted by the court, notwithstanding 
the failure of the court to establish a record of acts showing that 
the charged crime was intentionally committed and the court's 
failure to explain the defenses available to him. The motion 
should therefore have been granted. The decision of the District 
Court should therefore be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 1 p day of ( Q J L ^ *^P, 1992. 
Paul Gotay 
Attorney for Appellant 
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1 || MR. IWASAKI: But rather, submit it to the court? 
2 || THE DEFENDANT: Yes. That is true. 
3 || THE COURT: All right. 
4 II Mr. Phillips, did you — 
5 MR. METOS: May I also add, Your Honor, — 
6 You are also aware, Robert, of the state of the 
7 evidence and we have discussed the chances of your being found 
8 guilty of a lesser offense and being found guilty of the 
9 offense that is charged? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Yah. We have gone through that. 
11 THE COURT: All right. After having gone through that 
12 with your counsel, Mr. Phillips, do you have an opinion about 
13 the evidence against you? Do you think that you are likely to 
14 be convicted of the greater offense? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. Yes, ma'am, I do. 
16 THE COURT: All right. And we will be spending consid-
17 erable time, I think, reviewing that evidence, although, as I 
18 understand it, the defendant's plea is entered. 
19 And Mr. Phillips, I need you to indicate to me if 
20 you are entering your plea of guilty because you are in fact 
21 guilty of the offenses that are charged in the Information. 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am, I am. 
23 THE COURT: All right. Specifically, the Information 
24 alleges that on or about January 1st, 1980, here in Salt Lake 
25 County, you caused the death of Everett Hamby, Jr. while you 
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were engaged in the commission of an aggravated robbery? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Are those facts true and correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right. And did you cause his death 
knowingly and intentionally at that time? 
THE DEFENDANT: Not intentionally. It was accidental. 
But I was still at fault. 
THE COURT: All right. 
With respect to the intentional part, I will need 
a proffer from counsel respecting the facts that exist to 
establish intent. 
MR. IWASAKI: Your Honor, the facts would indicate that 
Mr. Hamby was shot once in the back of the head, a bullet 
going from right to left in an area about a centimeter above 
the top of his ear, exiting approximately — atop of his right 
ear, exiting approximately the middle of the temporal bone on 
his left ear. 
Further, the evidence will show, and Mr. Phillips 
has subsequently confessed to the — that a second and third 
shot were placed into the body by Mr. Phillips. 
Based upon Mr. Phillips' inability to explain the 
reasons why the second and third shot were fired, it is our 
opinion, Mr. Metos and myself, that, with a hurdle to pass, 
the facts would indicate an intentional nature, although in 
that the gun was clean and reloaded the day of the — or, the 
morning after the shots were fired into Mr. Hamby's body, 
which will account for the dissimilarities. 
There is no dissimilarity to preclude that from 
being the same gun merely because of these characteristics and 
the distortions. S S ^ ^ m ^ thal._tliis-.JA 
the same firearm, or the same cartridge tfrat ^ g^^pft--^— 
I would proffer at this time State's Exhibit 7-S 
for that purpose. 
MR. IWASAKI: I have no objections to that. I would 
like to make a point of clarification on this matter. 
The ATF agent did testify at the preliminary 
hearing. Now, is this report the one that was done 
subsequent? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: This is the report that was done and 
introduced at the preliminary hearing, and that reflects his 
testimony as to his report in the transcript at the prelim-
inary hearing, explains what he meant and the tests that he 
performed related to that exhibit. 
MR. IWASAKI: Because — Was there another test subse-
quent to the preliminary hearing? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. I have got that too. 
MR. IWASAKI: We haven't seen that one. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Also, Your Honor, I would like to have 
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1 apartment. And I believe Mr. Iwasaki has seen this also. 
2 MR. IWASAKI: That was admitted at the prelim? 
3 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Admitted at the prelim. 
4 MR. IWASAKI: Yes. 
5 MR. CHRISTENSEN: We would offer this also. 
6 THE COURT: That will be received, together with 
7 II everything else that has been offered. 
MR .^CHRISTENSEN: We would ask to be marked as State's 
9
 || Exhibit 17-S_ the follow-up Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
10 II report; again, done by Mr. Ed Peterson. And in that direct-
11
 || ive I asked him and Detect: ive Johnny Johnson asked_iiiJii_tP run 
12 || jyarious tests. 
13 We explained to him the position with which Mr. 
14 Hamby was shot and found at the time of the robbery. And at 
15 that time we asked him if certain tests could be performed 
16 respecting the distances involved to refute the contention of 
17 the intentional versus the accidental version that Mr. 
M Phillips gave us, and asked him to perform various ballistics 
19 tests. 
20 We sent him autopsy pictures, we sent him clothing 
21 of the victim, and other types of photographs, so that he 
22 could run these tests. And in those tests, just in summary of 
23 those tests, they ran various aspects__in terms of__the_first 
24 shot being fired and how far away that would have been. 
25 II Because, obviously, the closer the individual is, the more 
165 
1 likely it may have been accidental. And the second and third 
2 if shots that we knew were intentional, Mr. Phillips basically 
3 admitted that those were intentional. How far away those 
4 would have been fired also. 
5 Inhis report he indicates_tha±- the f ir&t-shat 
6 that_#as^fJLred was iri_a.jyiginity f rom_approximateJLy_ 24 to 3j) 
7 inches away fromthe accuseds The autopsy report will show 
8 t h a t t h e bullet entered the righjb_^j^de_of Mr. Hamby's skull a 
9 little bit to the left and above the right ear, traversed 
10 [I across the skulJ._arid_j^ajne_o^ centi-
11 jneter drop and just to the left of the left ear, the_lower 
12 II portion of the ear, and exited the body. The sluq_was^ not 
I no indication whether or not it had 13 recovered and there was 
jor 14 ricocheted off the pavement} if it had been lost in the 
15 field nearby where he was shot. 
16 The second and third shots entered the body cavity 
17 in the area of the chest, approximately one-and-a-half inches 
18 apart, a fairly close shot group. They were fired from dis-
19 II tance in excess of 30 inches. And the disfigured slug that 
20 II was analyzed and processed was one of the slugs that was found 
21 in the chest cavity on the far side of Mr. Hamby !s body. The 
22 autopsy report would indicate that any one of the three 
23 bullets would have killed him. 
24 There was a slight amount of bleeding with respect 
25 to the second and third gunshot wounds, which is consistent 
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1 I would indicate to the court that although Mr. 
2 Northern has testified respecting certain aspects of the case, 
3 he has been less than candid, less than truthful with respect 
4 at least to his knowledge and his involvement of what was to 
5 take place that day. 
6 I do have — 
7 THE COURT: What is the basis for that assertion? 
8 MR. CHRISTENSEN: I will get to that. If you will just 
9 give me a few minutes, I will tell you exactly why we know 
10 that. 
11 I would ask to have marked a certification, 
12 State's Exhibit 20. 
13 MR. IWASAKI: No objection. 
14 THE COURT: All right. 
15 MR. CHRISTENSEN: And as State's Exhibit 21, the autopsy 
) 6 \ \ report, which is a three page report done by Dr. Graham and 
17 witnessed by Monique Ryser of the medical examiner's office, 
18 which, again, indicates the cause of death, indicates the 
19 wounds, where they were positioned, and various other aspects 
20 that I have represented to the court as to the cause of death. 
2i The State's Exhibit 22-S, Your Honor, I have a 
22 signed copy entitiled a "Waiver of Rights" that was executed 
23 I b y M r . Phillips, witnessed by_Sg^ective Carl Voyles and 
24 Sergeant Nievvard at 1810 hours on January 9th, 1980, which is 
25 |[_a waiver of Miranda rights which was preparatory to his giving 
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introduced for the court. And if as I go along Mr. Iwasaki 
has an objection to that, he can register it and deal with it 
at that time. I don't know if he is. 
MR. IWASAKI: I am not going to oppose the admission of 
Northern's polygraph. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Some of the concern that the State had 
initially was tjie premeditation fantor»f tjTe planning factor of 
thecalleaed robbery^ and the murder itself. _It initially came 
down as something that occurred on spur of the moment and may 
have been an accidental shootino. 
Mr. Van Sciver ^polygraphed Mr. Northern prior to 
12 || taking a plea, and at that time the State was given the 
13 || impression that Mr. Northern was not polygraphing because of 
14 || an erratic heart condition that he has. Nonetheless, in that 
15 polygraph it was indicated that Northern lied, at least to his 
16 knowing that there was going to be a robbery occur, and that 
17 perhaps a killing.was to occur respecting the particular 
18 robbery in question. 
19 THE COURT: Well, now, I need to know whether those 
20 results were reliable, or were they affected by the heart 
2) condition? 
22 MR. CHRISTENSEN: We don't know that with respect to the 
23 first test, per se. I have not been privy to that. That was 
24 something that was done with defense's privilege, and this 
25 || sort of thing. 
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1 THE COURT: I see. 
2 MR. CHRISTENSEN: All I know is the representations that 
3 have been made to me. As a result of those representations, 
4 we had some concern respecting Mr. Northern's involvement. 
5 Of course, all along — Let me just indicate this to the 
6 court. 
7 Mr. Northern is a very bright young man. He is 
8 not a dummy by any means. He has a very high IQ. He is very 
9 pathological in the sense of being a manipulative sort of 
10 individual. He lied to his attorney, he lied to myself, and 
11 in essence lied in many respects as to the case. 
12 We had some concerns regarding that. At least 
13 culpability in the crime. There were certain types of things 
14 he could not lie to, certain types of physical evidence that 
15 he was never privy to. And the State would proffer that at no 
16 time was Mr. Van Sciver or Mr. Northern ever given full privy 
17 as to the exact quantum of evidence that we had or the quality 
18 of evidence that we had to corroborate or refute the state-
19 ments that he made. 
20 Certain of the statements that he made were 
21 relevant and were probative to the intentionalness of Mr. 
22 Phillips 1 guilt. Certain parts of those were out and out 
23 lies, primarily respecting his involvement, his age, and his 
24 intent. 
25 MR- IWASAKI: If I may interrupt at this time, Mike, in 
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1 towards the back. As he does so, Mr. Northern draws his .22, 
2 g^+g *\ b e a H °n Mr- Hamby. 
3 At that time the fare in the cab is run up to 
4 approximately — between $26 and $30. Mr. Northern doesn't 
5 know exactly how much that is. But apparently a conversation, 
6 according to Mr. Northern, is had. 
7 At the time he — apparently he knows or realizes 
8 that Mr. Hamby is apparently a member of his ward, that he 
9 knows him auspiciously on a very marginal basis, but does 
10 recognize him when they get in the cab, and apparently there 
11 is some debate as to whether or not they would rob him. 
12 II Apparently that debate begins somewhat late in the 
13 || course of driving around, which consisted of approximately an 
14 || hour-and-a-half driving around, to which it takes it up to 
15 
16 
approximately a $26 or $30 fare. 
Mr. Northern contends he tried to talk Mr. 
17 II Phillips out of the robbery at that time, said he would pay 
18 for cab fare, alleges he had approximately $215 in his pocket 
19 at that time. 
20 He claims initially that Mr. Phillips has $50. 
2i Later on he claims that Mr. Phillips did not have any money at 
22 all and needed the money, and he made the comment to Mr. 
23 Northern, "We have got to rob him, because I am not going to 
24 PaY f o r m Y half of the fare," type of a comment. 
25 || There are inconsistent statements made initially 
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by Mr. Northern in the initial hearing. He indicates that he 
does not see the first gunshot fired, does not know why Mr. 
Phillips would want to shoot Mr. Hamby, particularly in veiw 
of the fact that during this hour-and-a-half there are conver-
sations had about Mr. Hamby1s seven children, the fact that he 
has to work two or three jobs to support them, that they 
apparently like the individual, they like the man. He puts up 
no fuss, no struggle, and he, in his first statement, says he 
can't understand why that would take place. 
Later on at the preliminary hearing, the statement 
is made that he saw Mr. Phillips standing from approximately 
ten feet away with his arm extended in the direction of Mr. 
Hamby, who at the time of the impact of the first slug was in 
an all fours position behind the cab with his head facing away 
from the taillights of the cab down the road. 
I don't know, and the polygraph does not indicate 
tome, if it indicates anything to me. It
 1^ Afld!£>&te&-grt&at_M£^ , 
ttQE&Mtaa,^^ tLhftt first P^QLJLL^d^ But because of 
statements made after the fact of the case, he being as bright 
as he is, or trying to show the State more to make himself 
look better, makes the comment that he does see that first 
shot being intentionally fired. 
The allegation is made by Mr. Phillips in his 
statement that after the first shot was accidentally fired 
that he runs around to the driver's side of the cab to drive 
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1 let off on the trigger, and the gun discharged into the bed 
2 and into the floor. 
3 Two or three days ago we did go to the apartment, 
4 it is under new tenancy now, and did recover a slug which 
5 appears to be a ,357 Magnum slug in the proximity where Mr. 
6 Northern says we could find that slug. 
7 There is — There may be some consideration that 
8 that went off two days before, according to Mr. Phillips1 
9 version of that, and that there were other witnesses who could 
10 have heard the shots being fired. And of course, there is no 
11 way to prove or disprove that unless the people would be iden-
12 tically or exactly sure. 
13 This may be also part of the basis for Mr. 
14 Phillips1 claiming accidental discharge of a weapon. The 
15 indication that it perhaps did accidently discharge as the 
16 hammer was being released could have been the basis for the 
17 defense in the initial confession he gave to the police. 
18 Our ballistics, however, indicate a well aimed 
19 shot. Our ballistics and the positions that were given to the 
20 officers that took the statement indicate that at the time 
2i that Mr. Hamby was being robbed he was in basically a prone 
22 position on the ground, that Mr. Phillips was standing to his 
23 right side closest to his head area, and that Mr. Phillips, or 
24 Mr. Hamby„ was taking the money and his personal property out 
25 of his pockets and placing them in front of him on the ground 
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1 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much, Mr. 
2 Christensen. 
3 Does that complete, then, the State's presenta-
4 tion with respect to the facts in this case? 
5 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. Other than — At this time I 
6 believe 1-S, 14-S, 18-S, 19-S, 21-S, and 22-S have not been 
7 accepted. We would move for their introduction at this time. 
8 THE COURT: Are there any objections to the receipt of 
9 those? 
10 MR. IWASAKI: No objection to any of those. 
11 THE COURT: All right. All of those exhibits will be 
12 received. 
13 At this point, as I understand it, we are going to 
14 recess in this hearing until Monday morning at 10:00. 
15 MR. IWASAKI: No. 
16 THE COURT: All right. 
17 MR. IWASAKI-: That is not my understanding, Your Honor. 
18 It is the State's position that these are the 
19 reasonable inferences. Before we recess and have you go in 
20 only with the State's case in mind, theory in mind, I would 
21 obviously like an opportunity to give — it is not my position 
22 to argue with what has been said, but, rather, to point out 
23 other reasonable inferences from the evidence. 
24 THE COURT: All right. 
25 MR. IWASAKI: And I think that is essentially based upon 
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1 what has been presented by Mr. Christensen at this time. 
2 To begin with, Your Honor, it is uncontroverted 
3 that most of what Mr. Northern has testified or has stated to 
4 Mr. Christensen has been his third statement, once under oath, 
5 and he has since recanted that statement. We have two author-
6 ities as to what happened that night, what happened weeks 
7 before, and then the planning procedure. 
8 It is our position that Mr. Northern's multiple 
9 statements are so contradictory that, as the old jury instruc-
10 tion says, you can believe one against him or many against 
11 him. However, if you found that someone has lied on a mater-
12 ial fact, then you can disregard all of the testimony. 
13 I am not asking you to disregard all their testi-
14 raony, because the one main thing that is uncontroverted is 
15 both Mr. Phillips1 and Mr. Northern's admission that it was 
16 Mr. Phillips that shot Mr. Hamby. 
17 Unfortunately, and under whatever circumstances, I 
18 think that is the whole issue of the case. The whole issue in 
19 the case comes down to first versus the second degree murder. 
20 We have pleaded — We have admitted our involve-
2i ment, in fact, that would indicate a first degree murder, and 
22 we have done that after plea yesterday by stating that yes, he 
23 did fire those shots, and under circumstances which would lead 
24 one to believe that it was intentional and knowing. 
25 As to a review of the evidence, I think it all has 
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1 to be taken with an extremely large grain of salt as to what 
2 Mr. Northern is saying at this time. You can see the pattern 
3 that is developing in Northern's different statements. 
4 At first he acknowledges no knowledge whatsoever 
5 of the robbery, but then does place blame upon Mr. Phillips. 
6 Later he does acknowledge the robbery, as well as his pulling 
7 of the gun on Mr. Hamby, but then goes into greater detail as 
8 to what he saw. 
9 It is, further, very important, Your Honor, to 
10 realize that during the second polygraph test one of the first 
11 — one of the main questions asked of Mr. Phillips was, "Did 
12 you lie — " — of Mr. Northern was, "Did you lie when you said 
13 that you saw Mr. Phillips aim and fire that first shot?" He 
14 was found to be deceptive on that matter, extremely deceptive. 
15 That is the whole issue, who saw that first shot. 
16 No one saw that first shot except for Mr. Phillips, and Mr. 
17 Phillips 1 statement, which he has made once after a waiver, a 
18 full confession adding up almost tantamount to the first 
19 degree murder charge, he admitted that he shot Mr. Hamby, but 
20 under circumstances which I would indicate to the court is 
21 different. As Mr. Christensen has stated, the body positions 
22 would have such indications in Mr. Phillips 1 statement that 
23 Mr. Hamby was in fact on all four. 
24 Mr. Northern was walking away from the scene at 
25 the time. Mr^_Phillips was in this situation with his right 
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hand toward the victim's body, and he was bending over in an 
av^waxd^pos^jy,pn_jto pick up the money, and the gun in fact 
cLis charged -
s^ not coincidental that the gun would di_s-
'•'LSI 
charg 
coincidental that such a large gun could actually —,.„VQU^ 
actually cause scalp and hair to move and you could see that, 
^ ~ — 
The inference of_the State is that_jit_was a welJl 
planned shot. However, if you will look at the autopsy 
tes 
report, and it is, as Mr. Christensen stated, the 
Ip, cpr^  ttfrpIIB|right side, a b i t ^ — about three centimeters abgye^ 
the temporal bone, two-and-a-half to three centimeters from 
the tempoj le, excuse me, at the temporal bone on the left 
side,„iniilc_ati_ng "g^faat^yqje6\dry^ 
It is a tt%gfeg£yg,JjejgtOgSn^It is one which would^j^ 
THE COURT: Well, I am sorry^^J^ donf t under stand^Jthe-
inference that it. is a flat trajectory if there is a two 
centimeter drop. Wouldn't that indicate a slight angle? 
MR. IWASAKI It is an angle of two centimeters That 
is correct 
THE COURT: All right. But likely a flat trajectory 
•*mam£m 
which would be consistent with Mr. Phillips1 statement that as 
he bent down and .^picked up -%lf\e money he was down at -the level 
of Mr. Hamby at the time^, There is no doubt that Mr. Hamby_, 
was on a l l four . 
r f '1 1 'rHPHJfRTrr^inMTY"*^^—~ 
1' i H i M .l.im-"UT'JJ I 
201 
1 MR. IWASAKI: We have a question that it was in a 
2 front position or not. Northern doesn't help us out at all, 
3 because Northern has changed his statement two or three times 
4 regarding what he saw basically to the point where he saw 
5 nothing at all. 
6 You have to look at Phillips' statement. You have 
7 to look at Rob Phillips 1 statement as to what he said, and_ 
8 that is consistent with what he said, that Hamby was on all 
9 fours and as he was reaching down at a level consistent wi/th a 
10 (I — more or less a flat trajectory, the „gun did in fact JJLISJ 
n 
12 It was not, Your Honor, an execution type slaying. 
13 The gun — The trajectory of the bullet would not be consis-
14 tent with someone standing over somebody and shooting them in 
15 the side of t h e H R e a c T I t would be a much more severe angle. 
16 They would have to get down and be level with them to cause 
17 this kind o~f~Tffajectory-— 
18 Mr. Phillips is a small man, his arms are small. 
19 The distance between the time —JThedistance between the 
20 bullet and M r . Hamby fs head is r-nno * cfont - 9^ frflfi^fig, ^ ^ . l ^ ^ ^ t 
21 four —inches71's^Vjaryiclose^ especially when Hamby is taking out 
22 property and putting it in front of him, at which angle he is 
23 — Phillips is within 24 inches of him by the guru So it is 
24 consistent with the ballistics at that time. 
25 Northern did work for Ute Cab. Northern did have 
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1 the knowledge of previously knowing Mr. Hamby, or in a — or, 
2 at least seeing his face around. I am not saying at this time 
3 that that was the motive for the execution, but I think that 
4 is reasonable. That is a reasonable inference to be drawn. 
5 It wasn't Philips that was identifiable by Hamby. 
6 It wasn't Phillips that drove the cab to know how much money 
7 was going to be involved in a day after a holiday. It was 
8 Northern. 
9 I can't impress upon the court enough to look at 
10 all of the statements, especially the multiple statements of 
n Mr. Northern, and also the oral proffer made by Mr. 
12 Christensen. Because those statements are not put in a 
13 transcript. Those statements are all oral statements made to 
14 Mr. Christensen, of which I have no doubt that they were made, 
15 and I have no doubt that he is making them in good faith here. 
16 But they are not down on paper, and so Your Honor would have 
17 to look at all of. the facts and circumstances, including the 
18 preliminary hearing transcript. 
19 The preliminary hearing transcript would indicate, 
20 and also the medical reports would indicate, that while there 
2i was a pool of blood underneath the body of the victim at the 
22 time, it was not a massive amount of blood stemming from the 
23 chest wounds. 
24 Upon my questioning of Monique Ryser at the 
25 preliminary hearing, she stated that it would be consistent 
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with the blood that was there and the blood stemming from the 
head cavity, that the first shot was in fact of the head. So 
we have no question of that. 
And so the second and third shots, the lack of 
blood that you would expect on second and third shots into the 
body, it was not present, which would indicate there was a 
lapse of time, and that it was taken back again and there were 
two more shots fired into it. 
The inference that the State would have one 
believe was that those two shots were done very well aimed and 
planned. However, as you look at it in Mr. Phillips1 state-
ment, he fires two shots in rapid succession. There needn't 
be any need for aiming. If the first shot hit something, the 
second shot would indicate, the patterns would indicate, that 
it was a bang, bang kind of approach as he was walking around 
to the other side of the cab. 
At that time, based upon military experience, or 
even based upon the knowledge of the damage a .357 would make, 
Mr. Hamby, of course, was already dead at that time. 
To impress upon the court the issue as I see it, 
the main issue in this case is whether or not that first shot 
was intentional. 
There was only one person who saw that first shot, 
and that was Mr. Phillips. He was not able to testify about 
it. Mr. Northern did not see that first shot, and anything 
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1 concerning that first shot, what he saw and what Mr. Phillips 
2 did, is an admitted lie, because he did not see that. 
3 I think that you have to examine all of the state-
4 ments, including Mr. Phillips 1 statement that he gave volun-
5 tarily after signing the waiver, to determine the issue in my 
6 mind as to the — the full culpability of Mr. Phillips in his 
7 actions. And once again, I state that we did admit our 
8 actions in that matter, but I do believe it is subject to 
9 different inferences and interpretations. 
10 I will probably do a lot more on Monday as to 
n closing on this matter. But then, these are the points that I 
12 felt are important at this time, just so the court will have 
13 that into consideration while you are reviewing all the 
14 matters. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 
16 Do you have anything further this morning, Mr. 
17 Christensen? 
18 MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: All right. 
20 The court has received the exhibits that have been 
2i placed into evidence today. I am planning to spend some time 
22 this afternoon reviewing them and some of the cases that have 
23 been cited to me on legal questions which are before me. 
24 We will be in recess with respect to this case 
25 II until 10:00 o1 clock Monday morning, when I anticipate the 
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Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 265-2883 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
P l a i n t i f f , : AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT 
ALAN PHILLIPS 
v s . : 
ROBERT ALAN PHILLIPS, : Case No. CR-8Q-296 
Defendant . : Judge \UJ^AC£L ^ ^ W ^ W 
S t a t e of Utah ) 
County of S a l t Lake ) s s . 
Robert Alan P h i l l i p s , being f i r s t duly sworn, deposes and 
s a y s : 
1 . I am the de fendan t in t he a b o v e - e n t i t l e d a c t i o n . 
2 . I am of a d u l t y e a r s and f u l l y competent to t e s t i f y , and I 
make t h i s a f f i d a v i t on t h e b a s i s of my persona l knowledge. 
3 . Af ter my s e n t e n c i n g in t h i s c a s e , as I r e f l e c t e d on the 
p rocedu re used by t h e c o u r t in accep t ing my p l e a - b a r g a i n , I 
r ecogn ized t h a t c e r t a i n i m p r o p r i e t i e s may have been committed, and 
t h a t I may have had a v a l i d defense to the cha rge : namely, t h a t the 
k i l l i n g , not being i n t e n t i o n a l , might not have amounted to murder. 
4 . I a t t empted to secure counse l in an e f f o r t to withdraw my 
p l e a , b u t no a t t o r n e y with whom I spoke expressed any d e s i r e to 
t ake the c a s e , u n t i l I h i r ed Mr. Paul Gotay in approximately 
November of 1991. 
5. My previous efforts to secure counsel are summarized as 
follows: 
a. In October, 1983, I contacted Loni F. Deland, who 
indicated he would be unable to represent me due to a conflict in 
his schedule. 
b. In about May of 1984 I received a letter from J. 
Bruce Savage, who sought to dismiss a motion I had previously filed 
with the court in connection with this case; but I considered that 
his actions were not undertaken in my best interest, and 
accordingly did not feel that I could trust him. 
c. Sharyn Kelly, CSR, informed me in March, 1988, that 
my requested hearing transcript would cost $825.00; but later she 
reduced this to $625.00, which I paid her. The first copy of the 
transcript had been sent to my attorney, and I was unable to get it 
back. 
d. In April of 1988 I took a paralegal course, during 
which I became convinced that I could not represent myself in this 
matter, and that I needed an attorney. 
e. In December, 1989 I was informed by the American 
Civil Liberties Union that they were unable to help me. 
f. During the month of April, 1990, I was informed by 
three attorneys — Michael H. Wray, David Brown, and Randy Richards 
— that they were unable to take my case. 
g. In October, 1990, Craig S. Cook expressed interest in 
handling this matter, but changed his mind two months later. 
h. Mr. Gotay agreed on November 9, 1991, to handle my 
case. 
Further affiant saith not. 
Dated this // day of February, 1992. 
Robert Alan Philli 
State of Utah ) 
County of Salt Lake ) ss. 
On the // day of February, 1992, personally appeared before 
me Robert Alan Phillips, who being first duly sworn upon oath, 
signed the foregoing affidavit in my presence, and stated that the 
matters contained therein were true and correct, to the best of his 
information and belief. 
Residing a t 
My commission exp i res 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF UTAH 
1% Commssion Expires 
Onamber 1,1995 
VIRGINIA G.SEA3U*T,' 
P.O. Bex 250 
Draper, Ufch 34C23 
